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In this article, I wish to argue that J.S. Mill holds that theoretical reason is subordinate to practical 
reason.  Ultimately, this amounts to the claim that the norms of theoretical reason – those rules 
governing how we ought to believe – are grounded in considerations of utility.  I begin, in section 1, 
by offering an outline of Mill’s account of ‘Art of Life’ (the body of rules governing how we should 
act), before turning in section 2, to Mill’s account of the ‘Art of Thinking’ (the body of rules 
governing how we should believe).  In section 3, I suggest that, for Mill, the Art of Thinking is 
subordinate to the Art of Life, and that in an important sense, therefore, theoretical reason is 
subordinate to practical reason. 
 
1. Mill on the Art of Life 
In System of Logic VI.xii, Mill offers a sketch of his theory of practical reason.  Mill sets out his 
theory by introducing a distinction between what he labels ‘science’ and ‘art’. “Propositions of 
science assert a matter of fact: an existence, a co-existence, a succession, or a resemblance.”  In 
contrast, statements of art are “expressed by the words ought or should be”.  Such statements are 
“generically different from one[s] which [are] expressed by is, or will be”, and “do not assert that any 
thing is, but enjoin or recommend that something should be” (System, VIII: 949).1 “[T]he imperative 
mood is the characteristic of art, as distinguished from science. Whatever speaks in rules, or precepts, 
not in assertions respecting matters of fact, is art” (System, VIII: 943). 
The distinction, of course, is between the normative and the factual, and Mill’s use of ‘art’ 
and ‘science’ to identify this difference recurs throughout his work.2  A particular useful discussion is 
provided in On the Definition of Political Economy.  
 
[I]deas of science and art […] differ from one another as the understanding differs from the 
will, or as the indicative mood in grammar differs from the imperative. The one deals in facts, 
the other in precepts. Science is a collection of truths; art, a body of rules, or directions for 
conduct. The language of science is, This is, or, This is not; This does, or does not, happen. 
The language of art is, Do this; Avoid that.  Science takes cognisance of a phenomenon, and 
endeavours to discover its law; art proposes to itself an end, and looks out for means to effect 
it. (Definition, IV: 312) 
 
                                                 
1 All quotes from Mill are taken from Mill (1963–91) and are given by (short title, volume: page). 
2 See Macleod (2013) for a fuller discussion of Mill on the art/science divide. 
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All arts, Mill claims, are derived from the assumption that some object or state of affairs is 
valuable.  “Every art has one first principle, or general major premise, not borrowed from science; 
that which enunciates the object aimed at, and affirms it to be a desirable object” (System, VIII: 949). 
“The art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the science. The 
science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and having investigated its 
causes and conditions, sends it back to art with a theorem of the combination of circumstances by 
which it could be produced” (System, VIII: 944).  Each art is therefore formulated as an autonomous 
action-guiding body of rules, informed by a scientific understanding of the world, designed to bring 
about a specified end considered desirable: “[a]n art, or a body of art, consists of the rules, together 
with as much of the speculative propositions as comprises the justification of those rules” (System, 
VIII: 947). Mill offers the examples of “architecture” and the “medical arts”.  Architecture is the body 
of rules which aims at “beautiful or imposing” buildings; medicine is the body of rules which aims at 
the “preservation of health” (System, VIII: 949). 
We might term the ends of the individual arts proximate ends.  Such ends, Mill notes, are not 
self-certifying, and can often come into conflict.  The job of justifying and reconciling the ends set by 
the various arts – discerning their “place in the scale of desirable things”, and determining what we 
should do, all things considered – is given to what he terms the “Art of Life” or “Practical Reason” 
(System, VIII: 949–50).  Such determinations can, Mill claims, only take place on the basis of “an 
ultimate standard, or first principle of Teleology […] a Philosophia Prima peculiar to Art […] some 
standard by which to determine the goodness or badness, absolute and comparative, of ends or objects 
of desire” (System, VIII: 951). 
Each art, then, sets a proximate end which is itself justified by the overarching final end.  That 
ultimate end is, Mill claims, happiness. 
 
[T]he general principle to which all rules of practice ought to conform, and the test by which 
they should be tried, is that of conduciveness to the happiness of mankind, or rather, of all 
sentient beings: in other words, that the promotion of happiness is the ultimate principle of 
Teleology. (System, VIII: 951) 
 
Mill directs the reader to “the little volume entitled Utilitarianism” for “an express discussion and 
vindication of this principle” (System, VIII: 951).  A picture therefore emerges of happiness as 
grounding practical reason, or the Art of Life, as a whole.  “I do not mean to assert that the promotion 
of happiness should be itself the end of all actions, or even of all rules of action. It is the justification, 
and ought to be the controller, of all ends, but is not itself the sole end” (System, VIII: 952).3 
                                                 
3 It is, we might note, from happiness as the grounds of practical reason that Mill derives happiness as the 
grounds of morality – and not the reverse.  When Mill argues for the principle of utility, he does so from the 
standpoint of practicality as a whole, appealing to what we find a desirable end of action simpliciter – not 
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2. Mill on the Art of Thinking 
Mill has, on occasion, been charged with psychologism about logic – the view, roughly, that the laws 
of logic are simply descriptive psychological laws.4  The charge, at least in the simple sense of 
attempting to reduce the question of how we should (as a matter of logic) reason to a question of how 
we do (as a matter of psychology) reason, cannot be sustained.  For Mill is finely attuned to 
normativity of logic – and is clearly aware that, because of its normative status, it cannot be regarded 
merely as science.5 
 Chapter 20 of the Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy deals with the question 
of whether logic is a science or an art.  Mill’s foil throughout the chapter is William Hamilton’s own 
account of logic as the “Science of the Laws of Thought as Thought” (Examination, IX: 348).  Mill’s 
criticism of this formulation is detailed, and convincing – but for the purposes here, it will be enough 
to note that he ultimately argues that Hamilton is inconsistent.  Hamilton claims that logic is a 
science, but as Mill observes, we can only understand logic as the study of “the form of thought as 
thought” insofar as thought as thought is interpreted to mean valid thought.  To the extent that logic is 
the study of valid thought, however, it is not treated as a science, but rather as an 
 
Art – that of a mere system of rules.  It leaves Science to Psychology, and represents Logic as 
merely offering to thinkers a collection of precepts, which they are enjoined to observe, not in 
order that they may think, but that they may think correctly, or validly. 
 
This conception of logic of as an art, which Hamilton adopts in practice, Mill claims, “is 
much nearer the mark” than Hamilton’s professed view of logic as a science.  The study of thought as 
a science is merely the study of psychology, and not of logic – “the fact of thinking is a psychological 
phaenomenon and Logic is a different thing from Psychology” (Examination, IX: 357).  Logic, in the 
sense of being the discipline concerning the rules of valid inference, is “the Art of Thinking, which 
means of correct thinking” (Examination, IX: 361). 
In this sense, Mill clearly regards logic as an art.  Or at least logic includes, as a significant 
part, this art – for Mill goes on to clarify that logic is not only the Art of Thinking, but also the 
“science of the conditions of correct thinking” (Examination, IX: 361).  Indeed, this understanding of 
logic as involving art and science is confirmed by the System of Logic, where the logic is suggested to 
                                                 
merely from the moral point of view – and then moving to argue that this end must thereby be the ultimate end 
of morality.  “[H]appiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of 
all human conduct; from whence it necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a part is 
included in the whole” (Utilitarianism, X: 237, my emphasis).  See Eggleston, Miller, and Weinstein (2010) for 
useful discussion. 
4 See Skorupski (1989: 164ff.) for a useful discussion of the history of the charge.  
5 Cf. Godden (2017: 175–7). 
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be “the art and science of the pursuit of truth” (System, VII: 4–5).  The reason, likely, that Mill thinks 
it convenient to fold the descriptive science of thought into a definition of logic, is that scientific 
propositions about our mental operations and the world need to be drawn upon to frame satisfactory 
rules of thought for art.  “[A]rt, or a body of art,” we might remember, “consists of the rules, together 
with as much of the speculative propositions as comprises the justification of those rules” (System, 
VIII: 947, my emphasis). 
Whether we choose to think of logic as the Art of Thinking, with corollary facts of science, or 
as the Art of Thinking united with a corresponding science, however, is mainly a terminological 
question.  Wherever the boundaries of logic, properly so-called, lie, it is clear that Mill thinks that 
there is an art which is made up of a body of rules corresponding to the norms of good inference: “a 
set of rules or canons for testing the sufficiency of any given evidence to prove any given 
proposition” (System, VIII: 10–1).  Such rules – the principle of enumerative induction, and the 
clarification of that principle provided by the Canons of Induction which form the basis of scientific 
enquiry6 – provide guidance on how to reason well.  And, as is the case in all arts, the rules of this art 
must be rules framed in reference to some end, which is taken to be valuable.  That end, Mill claims, 
is truth. 
 
[W]hat is, peculiarly and emphatically, the end of Thinking? Surely it is the attainment of 
Truth. […] The most important, then, and at bottom the only important quality of a thought 
being its truth, the laws or precepts provided for the guidance of thought must surely have for 
their principal purpose that the products of thinking shall be true.  (Examination, IX: 365) 
 
That Mill identifies truth as the end of logic, of course, points to a significant difference 
between his conception of that subject and that which has become dominant in twenty-first century 
philosophy.  Mill thinks of logic not as merely concerned with deductive inferences, but with all 
arguments that are capable of eliciting new knowledge – theoretical reason, in all of its aspects.  
Mill’s interest, in his terms, is in the “Logic of Truth”, and not merely the “Logic of Consistency” 
(System, VII: 208). 
 
3. The Relation of Truth and Utility 
In System of Logic VI.xii.6, Mill notes that “[t]here is, then, a Philosophia Prima peculiar to Art, as 
there is one which belongs to Science.  There are not only first principles of Knowledge, but first 
principles of Conduct” (System, VIII: 951).  Mill’s reference to the Philosophia Prima of Science – 
the first principle of Knowledge – coming at the end of a book-long treatment of the topic is, of 
                                                 
6 See Fumerton (2009: 168–73) for detailed discussion of these rules. 
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course, to the principle of enumerative induction.7  Because he presents the contrast in this way, the 
assumption has been that Mill holds that there is a theoretical principle which is the mirror image of 
the principle of utility – a fundamental theoretical norm governing what we have reason to believe, in 
much the same way as the principle of utility sits as the fundamental practical norm governing how 
we have reason to act.8  Mill’s conception of reason, under this picture, is seen as bicameral.9 
The reality is, however, that although Mill notes that there is a first principle in each domain 
of reason, he nowhere explicitly commits himself to this model of the jurisdiction of, and relation 
between, those domains.  And, indeed, there is good reason to doubt that theoretical and practical 
reason exhibit this kind of symmetry.  For if how we should believe is a question of the Art of 
Thinking, and if, as Mill claims in System VI.xii.6, “all other arts are subordinate” to the Art of Life, 
then it seems quite clear that the Art of Thinking must be subordinate to the Art of Life (System, VIII: 
951).  Because Mill treats the Art of Life not simply as the most general practical art, but also as the 
most general art simpliciter, we must take its scope to include all human activity that is subject to 
normative assessment – including our thinking. 
As such, theoretical reason – that aspect of reason which determines how we should believe – 
must be taken to fall under the scope of practical reason, rather than to sit alongside it.  This order of 
priority is confirmed by a passage in Grote’s Plato, during which Mill refers to “an art which is a 
main portion of the Art of Living – that of not believing except on sufficient evidence” (Grote’s 
Plato, XI: 405).  Again, the art guiding how we should believe is viewed as part of the broader art of 
how we should live.  It is this broader art which must determine whether the “aim of any particular art 
is worthy and desirable, and what is its place in the scale of desirable things” (System, VIII: 949) – 
and truth, as the end of the Art of Thinking, should not be thought to be an exception.  The end of 
truth for belief, after all, is not given to us a priori – nor could it be, according to Mill’s empiricism, 
unless it is trivially verbal that we ought to believe what is true.  As such the end of truth cannot be 
taken to be self-certifying. 
We should be clear about what is, and what is not, involved in the claim that the Art of 
Thinking falls under the Art of Life. The claim is of course not that Mill abandons truth as the 
appropriate end of thinking and believing.  “The most important quality of an opinion on any 
momentous subject is its truth or falsity, which to us resolves itself into the sufficiency of the 
evidence on which it rests” (Theism, X: 430).  It concerns, rather, the justification that Mill thinks can 
be offered for taking it as such an end.  If the Art of Thinking falls under the Art of Life, that 
                                                 
7 We should not be misled by Mill’s reference to this first principle of science into thinking that this principle 
will itself belong to science.  As a principle, or a rule as to what we should believe, it will itself be a proposition 
of art: the normative claim that that having observed that x1, x2, x3, … xn  are P, one should believe that xn+1 is P.  
8 Such a view, of course, bears comparison to recent work – a product of the ‘value turn’ in epistemology – 
which seeks to draw parallels between the ‘oughts’ of epistemology and ethics.  See, for instance, M. Steup 
(1988) and Berker (2013).  More broadly, of course, it also connects the tradition considering the ‘ethics of 
belief’.  See Clifford (1876). 
9 Indeed, in previous work, it has been my own position.  See Macleod (2014: 151–5).  
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justification will be, at its roots, a practical one: a concern for utility.  But that should not be taken to 
in any way alter the proximate end of belief, and we should not think that Mill takes that end any less 
seriously than one who thinks of it as self-grounding.  That the art of architecture is ultimately 
justified by concerns of utility, after all, does not mean that Mill thinks beautiful or imposing 
buildings any less important.  Nor does it mean that Mill thinks that we ought, while engaged in 
architectural work, to aim directly at utility, rather than taking the construction of beautiful or 
imposing buildings as our guiding end. 
The claim that the proximate end of truth is justified ultimately by the final end of utility, 
then, is certainly not that we should simply believe whatever makes us happy.  But it of course it does 
depend on the claim that truth is in general conducive to utility. This is a claim, however, which Mill 
quite clearly endorses.  When engaging with the argument that some true opinions might justifiably be 
silenced on the grounds that they could be something other than conducive to utility, Mill explicitly 
denies that possibility.  “The truth of an opinion is part of its utility” (Liberty, XVIII: 233).  “The 
knowledge of every positive truth is a useful acquisition” (Utility of Religion, X: 405).  Possession of 
the truth is, Mill thinks, itself a useful means to happiness.10 
Of course, any account that seeks to ground the normative force of truth on that of utility must 
contend with the manifest psychological reality that truth is generally taken to be not only a means to 
happiness, but also as an appropriate end in itself.  In this regard, however, we might draw a telling 
comparison to the end of virtue. As is well known, Mill holds that the end of virtue, though grounded 
in utility and itself a proximate end in axiological terms, comes, nevertheless, to be “desired 
disinterestedly, for itself” (Utilitarianism, X: 235).  It does so by process of association with utility. 
 
There was no original desire of [virtue], or motive to it, save its conduciveness to pleasure, 
and especially to protection from pain. But through the association thus formed, it may be felt 
a good in itself, and desired as such with as great intensity as any other good.  (Utilitarianism, 
X: 236) 
 
Virtue and utility come to be so closely associated, Mill holds, that virtue is seen as “a good in itself, 
without looking to any end beyond it” and “a thing desirable in itself, even although, in the individual 
instance, it should not produce those other desirable consequences which it tends to produce” 
(Utilitarianism, X: 235).11  And indeed, one can see, in broad outline, how a similar process could 
lead to our viewing truth as a desirable end in itself.  In order, on any given occasion, to secure 
happiness or protection from pain, one must have some true belief as to the means of achieving that 
                                                 
10 Mill, of course, need not maintain that belief in truth is on each and every occasion conducive to utility – but 
rather that the connection between possessing truth and achieving utility is strong enough to justify its standing 
as a human end. 
11 See Miller (2010: 41–3) and Crisp (1997: 83–6) for useful reconstructions of Mill’s account of virtue. 
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end.  On many occasions we experience utility, then, some true belief must serve as prerequisite for 
that experience – and holding true beliefs will, over time, become more and more closely associated 
with utility, and be thought of as an end in itself. 
 Truth, then, functions as a genuine end for the Art of Thinking – and one that comes to be 
thought of not merely as a means to utility.  For all normal purposes, Mill holds, our thought should 
be guided by considerations of truth, and as such we should form beliefs strictly according to the 
norms of scientific enquiry.  Because of this relative independence of theoretical reason, it is perhaps 
not surprising that Mill makes relatively little play of the fact that theoretical reason is ultimately 
answerable to considerations of utility: in the vast majority of instances, the question simply does not 
arise as to whether practical reason should have any role in this process.12 
 
4. Conclusion 
I have, in this article, suggested that there is an important sense in which Mill holds that theoretical 
reason is subordinate to practical reason. In short, how we should believe is governed by the Art of 
Thinking, which provides rules of theoretical reasoning that have truth as their end – and given Mill’s 
claim that all arts are subordinate to the Art of Life, it seems clear that the Art of Thinking must be 
taken to fall under the Art of Life, which is to say “Practical Reason” (System, VIII: 950).  This has 
been missed by Mill scholars, I think, because until recently relatively little attention has been paid to 
the structure of the Art of Life – and almost no attention to the normative dimension of Mill’s theory 
of knowledge, which casts good formation of belief as an art.  As these aspects of Mill’s philosophy 
become better understood, so too will the relationship between theoretical and practical reason in his 
work. 
That Mill holds that practical reason is primary should, I think, strike us as interesting in 
itself.  But it should also strike us as interesting because it provides further insight into Mill’s relation 
to later movements in philosophy.  It has recently been argued that Mill’s antirealist approach to 
normativity pushes him in the direction of later pragmatist movements by leading him to view norms 
of theoretical and practical reason as, in the final analysis, tools to help us navigate the world.13  The 
                                                 
12 One qualification is perhaps significant enough to be worthy of notice.  Where theoretical reason remains 
silent on any given proposition, Mill holds that we cannot be warranted in believing that proposition.  But 
practical reason can legitimately play some role in regulating our thought in these cases, warranting hope: “it 
appears to me that the indulgence of hope with regard to the government of the universe and the destiny of man 
after death, while we recognize as a clear truth that we have no ground for more than a hope, is legitimate and 
philosophically defensible. The beneficial effect of such a hope is far from trifling. It makes life and human 
nature a far greater thing to the feelings, and gives greater strength as well as greater solemnity to all the 
sentiments which are awakened in us by our fellow-creatures and by mankind at large” (Theism, X: 485).  To 
the extent that hope is, in part, a cognitive state, then, Mill clearly does see practical reason playing a role in 
informing how we think about the world. 
13 See Macleod (2016: 78).  As I suggest in that paper, this connection is hardly surprising.  Alexander Bain, a 
key figure in the emergence of pragmatism was himself a disciple of Mill; William James claimed to have “first 
learned the pragmatic openness of mind” from Mill, who he pictured “as our leader were he alive to-day” 
(James 1907: v).  The connection merits more attention than it has yet received in the secondary literature. 
 8 
claim that theoretical reason at some level has its foundation in our practical interests – and that truth 
is desirable because of its use to us as human beings – is of course another such push towards 
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